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INTRODUCTION
Those who come to the United States seeking asylum often do so with
minimal personal belongings, basic English language skills, and little
knowledge of the United States’s legal system. One such immigrant was
Miguel Angel Arevalo Quintero. 1 Quintero, like many young men in El
Salvador, faced the dilemma of either joining a gang or living in constant
fear of one. 2 In 2012, Quintero joined MS-13, an international street gang
with a large presence in El Salvador, in an attempt at self-preservation. 3
However, Quintero, unable to cope with the atrocities associated with
MS-13, traveled to the United States and sought asylum only a few months
after joining. 4
In support of his claim for asylum, Mr. Quintero stated on his Form
I-589 that he sought asylum as a member of a particular social group, that
he was a former member of a gang, and that he feared MS-13 would
persecute him if he was forced to return to El Salvador.5 In support of these
claims, Quintero testified, while appearing pro se in immigration court,
that MS-13 sent him threatening Facebook messages and that his cousin
had been killed for deserting the gang. 6 Additionally, Quintero presented
extensive country conditions evidence detailing the prevalence of gang
violence in El Salvador. 7 However, the immigration judge denied all of
Quintero’s applications for relief. 8 Notably, the immigration judge’s
discussion of particular social groups consisted solely of a single footnote
1. Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 619 (4th Cir. 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id.; Jennifer J. Adams & Jesenia M. Pizaro, MS-13: A Gang Profile, 16
J. GANG RSCH. 1, 6 (2009) (“Violence plays a major role in MS-13 culture. ”).
4. Quintero, 998 F.3d at 619.
5. See id. at 641 (“[T]he immigration judge denied Petitioner’s application
for relief . . . .”); DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., OMB NO.
1615-0067, FORM I-589, APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL (2022).
6. Quintero, 998 F.3d at 619 (“[G]ang members in El Salvador sent him a
menacing Facebook message asking where he was and warning him, ‘we take
some time, but we don't forget.’”).
7. Id. at 620; UNIV. OF CAL. AT HASTINGS COLL. OF L. CTR. FOR GENDER
AND REFUGEE STUD., FINDING COUNTRY CONDITIONS EVIDENCE FOR ASYLUM
AND FEAR-OF-RETURN IMMIGRATION CASES PRO SE MANUAL 6 (2020)
(“‘Country conditions evidence’ refers to written documents that help explain the
danger and lack of protection in [an applicant’s] country.”).
8. Quintero, 998 F.3d at 620.
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asserting that Quintero was still in MS-13 despite the primary basis for
Quintero’s claim being that he is a member of a persecuted social group
as an MS-13 deserter. 9
Quintero subsequently appealed his case to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the immigration judge’s holding. 10 He
then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. 11 The Fourth Circuit found that the immigration judge and the BIA
failed to meaningfully consider the country conditions evidence Quintero
offered and that the court mischaracterized his testimony with its assertion
that he was still a member of MS-13. 12 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the lower authorities’ denial of relief and remanded the case. 13 In
support of its holding, the Fourth Circuit stated that it is especially
important for immigration judges to develop the record in pro se cases
because a developed record is critical to facilitate a meaningful appeal. 14
In its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit noted, “In our country, few
populations are as vulnerable as non-citizens facing removal proceedings
who are unable to secure the assistance of adequate counsel. Yet the
consequences they may face are severe: family separation, prolonged
detention, and deportation to a country where persecution or even death
awaits.” 15 Further, the court determined that it would be an unreasonable
policy to place the burden solely on asylum seekers to meaningfully
develop the record given that they are often “poor, young, uneducated, or
(like Petitioner) all three.” 16 Thus, the court recognized that an important
aspect of the immigration judge’s role is to develop a record that would
facilitate a meaningful appeal.17
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Quintero v. Garland, asylum seekers
are often unaware of what evidence would convincingly support their case
or meaningfully develop the record because of a lack of English language
skills and legal knowledge. 18 Other federal circuit courts, however, seem
to have ignored these practical observations in similar cases concerning
procedures intended to develop the record in asylum and withholding of

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647–48.
Id. at 643–47.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 647.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 632.
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removal cases. 19 Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), or Title 8, § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the United States
Code, governs how a non-citizen is to sustain the burden of proof within
asylum and withholding of removal proceedings. 20 The last sentence of
the provision provides, “Where the trier of fact determines that the
applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible
testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not
have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 21 Courts
that fail to recognize the practical concerns outlined in Quintero have
interpreted this provision to not require that the immigration judge provide
notice to the petitioner about any evidentiary deficiencies prior to a final
judgment. 22 This interpretation leaves the task of determining which facts
best support one’s cause to the applicant, who likely has little to no legal
experience. Therefore, not requiring immigration judges to provide notice
also requires the applicant to create a record that supports a full and fair
hearing with the immigration judge, an appeal to the BIA, and any
subsequent appeals. As the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning suggests, this
practice is unlikely to consistently result in a record that supports a
meaningful appeal. 23
Additionally, the current procedures for asylum and withholding of
removal proceedings 24 allow for wide variances from judge-to-judge in the
frequency with which asylum and withholding of removal are granted. 25
The New York immigration courts provide an example of such
variances. 26 In the New York immigration courts, one immigration judge
19. See, e.g., Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Gaye v.
Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 945 F.3d 757 (5th Cir.
2020); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018); Uzodinma v. Barr, 951
F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2020).
20. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
21. Id.
22. See Rapheal, 533 F.3d 521; Gaye, 788 F.3d 519; Avelar-Oliva, 945 F.3d
757; Wei Sun, 883 F.3d 23; Uzodinma, 951 F.3d 960.
23. See generally Quintero, 998 F.3d 612.
24. See INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); INA §§
240(b)(4), 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4), 1229a(b)(5).
25. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
TRAC IMMIGR., https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2020/denialrates.h
tml [https://perma.cc/68PB-GCAT] (last visited June 5, 2022).
26. See id. The Executive Office for Immigration Review, which is under the
Department of Justice, administers the immigration court system. Immigration
courts conduct civil administrative proceedings. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., FACT
SHEET: OBSERVING IMMIGRATION COURT HEARINGS (2018), https://www
.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1079306/download [https://perma.cc/FF3L-RZEB].
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grants asylum in only 5% of cases while another grants asylum in 97% of
cases. 27 Such variances exist in immigration courts across the country. 28
Discrepancies this large indicate that there is an unacceptable amount of
arbitrariness in these proceedings and raise serious doubts as to whether
the immigration court system consistently gives meaningful hearings to
non-citizens.
Congress must rectify this issue by providing asylum-seekers an
opportunity to meet with the immigration judge overseeing their cases in
between the calendar and merits hearings.29 To implement this, Congress
should amend the procedure for removal proceedings in asylum cases to
add a conference between the applicant and the immigration judge. In this
conference, the immigration judge would identify those facts within the
non-citizen’s testimony that need additional evidentiary support. If the
non-citizen presents the identified evidence, a presumption that the noncitizen has satisfied the burden of proof would be established.
Part I of this Comment sets forth the development of the law and
procedures governing asylum and withholding of removal by first looking
to the impetus for providing asylum to refugees. It also examines the
pathways to asylum within the United States and the due-process rights
those procedures afford to non-citizens. Part I then gives an overview of
current jurisprudence concerning the procedural rights INA
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) grants.
Part II of this Comment analyzes the insufficiencies of current
jurisprudential interpretations of INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii). This analysis
highlights the need for Congress to amend the statutory procedures for
asylum and withholding of removal. Part III of this Comment proposes a
solution to the problems Part II enumerates. Specifically, Part III suggests
that Congress should amend INA § 240(b) to provide for a conference
between the calendar hearing and the merits hearing of asylum and
withholding of removal proceedings. During this conference, the
immigration judge would identify shortcomings in the evidence the noncitizen gathered or facts in need of additional support. Further, if the non-

27. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
28. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 26.
29. The master calendar hearing is the first hearing of the adjudicatory
process and serves to advise non-citizens of their rights within the process and the
timeline associated with the process. The merits hearing, which is sometimes also
referred to as the individual calendar hearing, is a more formal hearing on
contested matters. See INA §§ 240(b)(4), 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4),
1229a(b)(5); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10, 1240.15 (2022).
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citizen can provide the requested information, the proposed statute will
create a presumption that the non-citizen met the burden of proof.
I. THE HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF
REMOVAL
The concerted international effort to provide greater aid for refugees
began in the wake of World War II with the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, an international agreement that imposed a duty on
countries to consider receiving refugees fleeing persecution. 30 The 1951
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951
Convention) reinforced this, and in 1967, the United Nations Protocol
Relating to Refugees affirmed the duty to take refugees. 31 The statutory
basis for asylum traces its roots back to the 1951 Convention, and that
convention remains the primary framework for the treatment of refugees
in the United States. 32
The 1951 Convention defined both the classes of people constituting
refugees and the protections that should be afforded to them. 33
Specifically, the 1951 Convention considered refugees to be those
unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin because of a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 34 Notably,

30. See generally G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
31. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right To Seek Asylum in the United
States: The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 303, 312 (2001).
32. See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP, PROCESS AND POLICY 734 (9th ed. 2020).
33. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
34. Id. art. 1:
A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall
apply to any person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933
and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee
Organization during the period of its activities shall not prevent the
status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of
paragraph 2 of this section;
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the drafting history of the 1951 Convention suggests that the convention
was not intended to require countries to grant lawful status to any person
meeting the definition of a refugee. 35 Instead, the 1951 Convention
reserved most of the rights generally associated with asylum, like the
rights to work authorization and social security, solely for those lawfully
in a country. 36 Additionally, the 1951 Convention granted refugees
unlawfully residing in participating countries the rights to non-refoulment
and access to courts. 37 Many developed countries granted initially
unlawful immigrants lawful status as a result of the right to nonrefoulment. 38 This lawful status and the additional rights flowing from it
are known as asylum in many countries. 39 The United States formally
accepted this duty to accept refugees fleeing persecution by signing the
1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees a year
after the United Nations drafted it. 40 Then, the Refugee Act of 1980
codified the right to seek asylum. 41
A. History of Asylum in the United States
Although not codified until 1980, Congress has long recognized the
need to provide exemptions in immigration law to prevent immigrants who
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term “the
country of his nationality” shall mean each of the countries of which he
is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the
protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason
based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection
of one of the countries of which he is a national.
35. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 810–11.
36. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 33, arts. 17,
23, 24.
37. Id. art. 16. Non-refoulment is the right to not be forced to return to the
country where a refugee was persecuted. See id. art. 33.
38. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 733.
39. Id. at 812.
40. Coffey, supra note 31, at 314.
41. See generally Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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have unjustly become political enemies of their home country’s
government from being returned to their home country. 42 This policy
prevails even when an immigrant is otherwise inadmissible or
deportable. 43 Congress illustrated this policy in 1875 when it provided that
immigrants who have been convicted of a crime were not excludable if
they had been convicted of political offenses in their home country. 44
However, Congress did not systematically attempt to provide asylum until
the end of World War II. 45 Recognizing their inadequate efforts to assist
Jewish refugees during the Holocaust, the United States and the
international community took action to provide for refugees. 46 For the next
30 years, Congress enacted legislation that spurred deliberate action to
welcome refugees to the United States.47
Some of these focused initiatives dealt with displaced persons World
War II left stranded, 48 refugees from the Hungarian revolution in 1956, 49
and Cubans who fled after Fidel Castro took power. 50 In 1950, Congress
also enacted the International Security Act, which prevented non-citizens
from being deported to any country that the Attorney General determined
would subject them to physical persecution. 51 A few years later, Congress
amended the International Security Act to make explicit that withholding
deportation falls within the Attorney General’s discretion. 52 The power to
withhold deportation later became known as withholding of deportation
and is now known as withholding of removal. 53 As originally enacted in
42. See Page Act of 1875 (Immigration Act), ch. 141 § 5, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 733.
46. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note
33; Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The Holocaust (1933–1945) was
the systematic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million European
Jews by the Nazi German regime and its allies and collaborators. Introduction to
the Holocaust, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA (Nov. 5, 2021), https://encyclopedia
.ushmm.org/content/en/article/introduction-to-the-holocaust [https://perma.cc/W
67E-Z994].
47. See generally ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 734.
48. Displaced Persons, Refugees and Orphans Act, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009
(1948).
49. Peter Pastor, The American Reception and Settlement of Hungarian
Refugees in 1956–1957, 9 HUNGARIAN CULTURAL STUD, E-J. AM. HUNGARIAN
EDUCATORS ASS’N 197, 200 (2016).
50. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
51. Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 23, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
52. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
53. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2022).
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INA § 243(h), withholding of removal afforded no official immigration
status, although it did provide some basic protections. 54 Subsequently, the
Refugee Act of 1980 improved the position of refugees who came to the
United States on their own. 55
In particular, Congress enacted § 208 of the INA, which established
asylum status for immigrants who are refugees as defined in the 1951
United Nations Convention. 56 In addition to creating asylum, the Refugee
Act also amended § 243(h) to make its provisions mandatory. 57
Accordingly, these actions brought the United States in line with its
obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol. 58 As an important
part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) amendments, Congress moved § 243(h) to § 241(b)(3) of
the INA. 59 Thus, today, INA §§ 208 and 241(b)(3) establish two distinct
forms of relief for immigrants who come to the United States fleeing
persecution. 60 Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, which governs
asylum, requires that immigrants have a well-founded fear of persecution,
while § 241(b)(3), which governs withholding of removal, requires that
the immigrants show that their life or freedom would be threatened if they
were returned to their home country. 61
A few key differences exist between those who are allowed to stay in
the country via asylum under § 208 and those allowed to stay via
withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3). On the one hand, recipients of
asylum are allowed to, among other things, work, bring their families to
the United States, 62 and receive a pathway to citizenship. 63 On the other
hand, those withheld from removal may receive work authorization 64 but
may not be allowed to bring their families, and, in principle, they could be
removed at any time if a third country is willing to receive them.65
54. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (barring the Attorney General from
deporting immigrants to countries where, in the Attorney General’s opinion, the
immigrants would be subject to physical persecution).
55. See generally INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (establishing asylum status for
individuals who met the statutory definition of refugee).
56. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
57. INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (1952) (amended 1960).
58. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967).
59. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
60. INA §§ 208, 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3).
61. INA §§ 208, 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231(b)(3).
62. INA § 208(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).
63. INA § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
64. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(10) (2022).
65. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
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Additionally, unless they can qualify for citizenship on other grounds,
parties withheld from removal are left indefinitely without official status. 66
B. Procedures for Seeking Asylum and Withholding of Removal
Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(A) sets forth the
statutory basis for granting asylum. 67 This provision grants the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to grant asylum
to any non-citizen who follows the requisite procedures. 68 If the applicant
follows these procedures, the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security must then deem the applicant a refugee as defined in
the INA. 69 The INA defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . 70
Thus, the INA gives broad authority to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security to grant asylum.
Applications for asylum and withholding of removal follow one of
three different paths depending on whether the asylum applicant is in
removal proceedings when the application is filed and if so, in what kind
of removal proceeding. 71 These paths are: (1) the affirmative path; (2) the
defensive path; and (3) the expedited removal procedure. 72 The two most
prominent paths are affirmative and defensive applications. 73 When
seeking asylum affirmatively, non-citizens present their case before an
asylum officer prior to the initiation of removal proceedings. 74 When
seeking asylum defensively, non-citizens submit an application to the
immigration judge after the initiation of removal proceedings. 75
Regardless of whether a non-citizen seeks asylum affirmatively or
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id.
INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
Id.
Id.
INA § 201(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
See INA §§ 208, 235, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1225.
See INA §§ 208, 235, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1225.
See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
Id.
Id.
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defensively, the substantive criteria for establishing eligibility are the
same. 76 Additionally, applicants generally must seek asylum within one
year of arrival; however, the INA does not provide a time limit in which
applicants may seek withholding of removal. 77 The third path is through
the expedited removal procedure, which typically applies to certain noncitizens arriving to or recently entering the United States. 78 The expedited
removal procedure only allows asylum for a narrow class of citizens who
must first clear a credible-fear screening before their case moves forward
as a defensive application. 79
As a preliminary matter, Congress requires non-citizens applying for
both asylum and withholding of removal to file a Form I-589. 80 This form
asks applicants questions such as why they are seeking protection and what
risks they may face if they return to their home country. 81 This form also
asks for information that is relevant to asylum seekers’ claims, such as
whether they have any organizational affiliations, the current whereabouts
and conditions of family members, and the circumstances of their
departure. 82 Applicants may also provide additional materials such as
news accounts about the conditions of their home country, affidavits,
medical records, and human rights reports. 83 Further, INA § 208 requires
that, at the time of filing an application, non-citizens be made aware of
their privilege to be represented by counsel and provided a list of attorneys
who represent asylum seekers pro bono. 84 Section 208 further states that
asylum may not be granted until the applicant’s identity is checked across
law enforcement and national security databases. 85
The first of the three paths for seeking asylum, an affirmative
application, applies to applicants who are not currently in removal
proceedings. 86 Applicants in the affirmative process may file an
76. Patrick J. Glen, In re L-A-C-: A Pragmatic Approach to the Burden of
Proof and Corroborating Evidence in Asylum Proceedings, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 6 (2020).
77. INA § 208(a)(2)(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(b).
78. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
79. See id.
80. 8 C.F.R §§ 208.3, 1208.3 (2022).
81. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See INA § 208(d)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4).
85. INA § 208(d)(5)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(i).
86. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/obtain
ing-asylum-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/BC7C-YNUD] (last visited
Aug. 15, 2022).
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affirmative application by mailing a Form I-589 to the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). 87 The USCIS then
schedules an interview with applicants who submitted compliant
applications. 88 Subsequently, asylum officers perform a non-adversarial
interview with the applicant. 89
Asylum officers grant or deny applications on the basis of the
application, information gathered from the interview and the State
Department, and “other credible sources, such as international
organizations, private voluntary agencies, news organizations, or
academic institutions.” 90 Asylum officers grant asylum in meritorious
cases anywhere from 15% to 50% of the time. 91 Generally, when an
asylum officer finds that a case does not meet the standards for asylum,
the case is referred to immigration court. 92 There, an immigration judge
will consider the case in a removal proceeding. 93
The second pathway, the defensive application, applies to applicants
seeking asylum once a removal proceeding is already underway. 94 Here,
the applicant can only apply for asylum and withholding of removal by
providing a defensive application to an immigration judge. 95 This subjects
the applicant to the burden of proof found in INA § 208. 96 Asylum and
withholding of removal applicants typically state their desire to seek these
forms of relief to the immigration judge at the master calendar hearing,
which is the first hearing in removal proceedings. 97 During the master
calendar hearing, the court schedules a second hearing to adjudicate
contested matters and applications for relief, which is called the merits
hearing. 98 The judge then grants applicants a certain period of time in
which applicants must fill out Form I-589 and file it with the judge. 99 The
matter then proceeds to the more formal merits hearing, which involves a
87. See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 5.
88. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9 (2022).
89. Id. As prescribed by statute, asylum officers are full-time professionals
who receive training in areas such as international human rights law and nonadversarial interview techniques. Id. § 208.1.
90. Id. § 208.12(a).
91. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 737.
92. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1) (2022).
93. Id.
94. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 86.
95. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2022).
96. INA § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).
97. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 738.
98. See INA §§ 240(b)(4), 240(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4), 1229a(b)(5);
8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.10, 1240.15 (2022).
99. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 32, at 738.
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS) trial attorney and examination
and cross-examination of witnesses. 100 The examinations include crossexamination by the applicant or the applicant’s counsel of any witnesses
provided by the Department of Homeland Security. 101
The third pathway by which a non-citizen may seek asylum is an
application during expedited removal proceedings. 102 In expedited
removal proceedings, INA § 235(b)(1), in tandem with INA §§
212(a)(6)(C) or (7), subjects non-citizens to removal by an immigration
officer as opposed to an immigration judge. 103 However, this is only the
case for individuals in one of the following categories: (1) entrants arriving
at ports of entry; (2) entrants brought to the United States after interdiction
at sea; or (3) entrants apprehended within 100 miles of the U.S. and within
14 days of entrance who have not been admitted or paroled. 104 Under §§
235(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii), immigration officers may order non-citizens
removed for having false or inadequate identification or for other fraud or
misrepresentation. 105 A non-citizen who falls into this class but who
expresses a fear of return or an intention to seek asylum is then referred to
an asylum officer who interviews the non-citizen. 106 The purpose of this
interview is to determine if the non-citizen has a credible fear of
persecution, defined in INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v) as a “significant possibility
. . . that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum . . . .” 107 If asylum
officers determine that the non-citizen has such a possibility of
establishing his or her claim, then the case moves forward on the merits as
a defensive asylum claim.108 Alternatively, if asylum officers determine
that the non-citizen did not meet the significant-possibility standard, the
100. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 4.16(d)
(2020).
101. Id.
102. INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
103. Id.; INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C), 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C),
1182(a)(7).
104. HILELL R. SMITH, CONG. RSRCH. SERV., IF 11357, EXPEDITED REMOVAL
OF ALIENS: AN INTRODUCTION (2022); 69 Fed. Reg. 48878 (August 11, 2004);
INA §§ 212(a)(6)(C), 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7); 22 C.F.R.
§ 40.1(p) (2022) (“Port of entry means a port or place designated by the DHS at
which an alien may apply to DHS for admission into the United States.”).
105. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(i–ii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i–ii); INA §§
212(a)(6)(C), 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7).
106. INA §§ 235(b)(1)(A)(i–ii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i–ii); INA §§
212(a)(6)(C), 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7).
107. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v).
108. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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non-citizen is ordered to be removed. 109 However, the non-citizen can
request that an immigration judge review a negative determination no later
than one week after the determination is made. 110 Judicial review of the
immigration judge’s decision on credible fear is available in limited
circumstances. 111
Lastly, if a non-citizen is ineligible for asylum for reasons such as not
requesting asylum within a year of entry or a disqualifying criminal
history, the non-citizen may request withholding of removal under INA §
241(b)(3) as an alternative form of relief. 112 This is because the Attorney
General’s grant of such is not discretionary if the non-citizen can meet the
burden of proof. 113 A non-citizen qualifies for withholding of removal if
the Attorney General finds that the non-citizen’s life or freedom would be
threatened if returned to the non-citizen’s home country. 114
Similarly, asylum applicants may establish eligibility for asylum by
showing either that they have suffered persecution or that they have a wellfounded fear of future persecution. 115 Although persecution is not defined
in the INA, 116 courts have defined it as an extreme concept, which includes
the threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or liberty on account
of a protected ground, such as race, religion, or nationality. 117
C. Due Process
Having established the statutory basis and the procedures by which
non-citizens seek relief from persecution, the next questions are what
rights these statutes confer upon the non-citizen and how non-citizens raise
perceived issues with the handling of their cases. The answers to these
questions center on the due-process rights of non-citizens seeking relief
from persecution. Generally, non-citizens within the United States have

109. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii).
110. INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III).
111. INA §§ 242(a)(2)(A), 242(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), 242(e).
112. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Glen, supra note 76, at 6 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2020)).
116. Id. (citing Marquez v. INS, 105 F.3d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“Congress
has left defining the word ‘persecution’ to the courts.”).
117. See, e.g., id. at 6–7 (citing Kipkemboi v. Holder, 587 F.3d 885, 888 (8th
Cir. 2009)).
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the benefit of full due-process rights in non-immigration contexts 118 but
far more limited due-process rights within the context of immigration. 119
The basis of due process within the context of an immigration
proceeding begins in 1889 with Ping v. United States, colloquially known
as the “Chinese Exclusion Case.” 120 This case arose in response to the
Scott Act, which prohibited the return of Chinese laborers to the United
States even if they had been issued a certificate that, under a previous
congressional act, allowed them to return. 121 Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese
laborer with such a certificate, left the United States while the certificate
still allowed entry but returned after the Chinese Exclusion Act invalidated
it. 122 Thus, after returning from a trip to China to visit his family, the
federal government denied Chae Chan Ping entry pursuant to the Scott
Act. 123 In response, Chae Chan Ping brought an action against the federal
government claiming that the act violated his due-process rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 124
118. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). The Supreme Court explicitly
recognized non-citizens’ rights to traditional due process in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.
The 1886 case involved the city of San Francisco shutting down Chineseimmigrant-owned laundry mats. Id. at 366. The main issue in Yick Wo was
whether a city ordinance that allowed the city of San Francisco to shut down all
200 Chinese-owned laundries and only one Caucasian-owned laundry mat was
unconstitutional. Id. The Court answered as a preliminary issue, however, whether
the Chinese immigrants were entitled to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause despite the Chinese immigrants not being
citizens of the United States. Id. at 367. On this point, the Court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to citizens and that its provisions are
“universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction . . . .” Id. at 369. Thus, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes no distinction between a citizen and non-citizen. Id.
119. See generally Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
120. Id. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1625, 1633 (1992) (“The first Supreme Court case to consider directly the federal
government’s power to exclude aliens was the Chinese Exclusion Case, decided
in 1889”); Lauri Kai, Embracing the Chinese Exclusion Case: An International
Law Approach to Racial Exclusions, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2617 (2018).
121. Ping, 130 U.S. at 589 (citing § 4 of the Restriction Act of May 6, 1882,
as amended by the Act of July 5, 1884, 22 St. p. 59, c. 126; 23 St. p. 115, c. 220).
122. Id. at 582.
123. Id. at 589. The statute referred to in this case was § 4 of the Restriction
Act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884. Id.
124. Id. at 582. The primary distinction between the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments is that the Fifth Amendment applies the federal government while
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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The United States Supreme Court rejected Chae Chan Ping’s claim
and instead acknowledged the government’s plenary power to control
immigration. 125 Specifically, the Court stated that “[T]he government of
the United States . . . can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition
which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own
territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.” 126 The
Court reasoned that it is a basic function of a government to control who
is allowed to enter its territory.127 The Court specifically stated, “The
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States . . . cannot be granted
away or restrained on behalf of any one.” 128 Thus, the Court held that the
United States government possessed the plenary power to exclude any
non-citizens from entering the country. 129 Therefore, non-citizens
attempting to enter the United States do not have any due-process rights. 130
A few years later in 1893, the Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States
faced a habeas corpus issue raised by non-citizens already within United
States territory. 131 Specifically, Fong Yue Ting involved three Chinese
laborers who were arrested and held by the federal government for not
having certificates of residence. 132 The Court specifically addressed
whether non-citizens within the United States have more due-process
rights than those seeking to enter the country. 133 Here, the Court held that
non-citizens are only entitled to the safeguards of the Constitution and the
protection of the laws of the United States while the government permits
them to remain in the United States.134 The Court noted that Congress,
under its power to exclude or expel non-citizens, may remove any noncitizen from the country through executive officers without judicial trial
or examination. 135 Finally, the Court held that an order of deportation is
not a punishment; therefore, the provisions of the Constitution securing
125. Ping, 130 U.S. at 581.
126. Id. at 603.
127. Id. at 603–04.
128. Id. at 609.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 698 (1893).
132. Id. at 703.
133. Id. at 711.
134. Id. at 724.
135. Id. at 728 (“[C]ongress, under the power to exclude or expel aliens, might
have directed any Chinese laborer found in the United States without a certificate
of residence to be removed out of the country be executive officers, without
judicial trial or examination . . . .”).

2022]

COMMENT

427

the right to a trial by jury and prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures were not applicable. 136 Thus, between Ping and Fong Yue Ting,
the Supreme Court established that Congress holds plenary power over
immigration in both the admission and deportation contexts.
1. The Supreme Court Extends Procedural Due Process to
Unauthorized Immigrants in Immigration Proceedings
In 1903, a decade after Fong Yue Ting and 14 years after Ping, the
Supreme Court in Yamataya v. Fisher, often referred to as the “Japanese
Immigrant Case,”137 explicitly extended due-process rights to immigrants
alleged to be in the United States either lawfully or unlawfully. 138
Yamataya involved a Japanese immigrant who challenged an
administrative decision that found her to be a pauper and, thus, excludable
under the applicable immigration statutes. 139 Specifically, the immigrant
claimed that she was deprived of procedural due process, as she was not
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 140 In response to these claims,
the Court held that while it is true that Congress vested the executive
branch with the power to exclude immigrants at the border, a different set
of rules must apply to afford due process to immigrants within the
jurisdiction of the United States. 141
Specifically, the Court held that it is unlawful for an executive officer
to deport an immigrant who has entered the country, even illegally,
without giving that immigrant an opportunity to be heard on questions
concerning his or her right to remain in the country. 142 Additionally, the
Court stated that allowing executive officers to do so would constitute an
arbitrary exercise of power that would be incompatible with the principles
of due process of law. 143 Notably, the Court did not address whether an
unauthorized immigrant can invoke the Fifth Amendment; instead, the
Court based the immigrant’s right to due process in the immigration
136. Id. at 730.
137. Motomura, supra note 120, at 1637; Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,
33 (1982).
138. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
139. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 94. The term excludable is not used in the modern
immigration framework. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act changed the language to admissible. Pub. L. 104-208, 100 Stat.
3009–575 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)).
140. Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 94.
141. Id. at 100.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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statutes. 144 Further, the Court noted that due process does not necessarily
require an opportunity to be heard “upon a regular, set occasion, and
according to the forms of judicial procedure . . . .” 145 However, the Court
stated that it does include an opportunity to be heard that will secure the
prompt and vigorous action that Congress intended while still being
appropriate for the nature of the case. 146 Thus, the Court established that
immigrants within the jurisdiction of the United States are entitled to at
least the procedural due-process rights within the immigration statutes,
even for immigrants arriving in the United States illegally.147 Although the
Court decided Yamataya well over a century ago, its principles remain in
effect today. 148 This is evident in the Court’s affirmation of these
principles in cases such as Landon v. Plasencia, where the Court held that
a returning non-citizen who was stopped at the border but was later being
held in the United States was entitled to procedural due process. 149
2. Procedural Due Process vs. Substantive Due Process
The Yamataya Court’s avoidance of whether the immigrant was
entitled to substantive due process under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution is significant. The difference between procedural and
substantive due process is that those entitled to only procedural due
process may only challenge the divestiture of their liberty or property by
challenging the process by which they were divested. 150 Specifically, a
plaintiff seeking to challenge procedural due process would allege that the
divestiture was not conducted in a manner consistent with the process
prescribed by Congress in the governing statute. 151 This means that a
person entitled solely to procedural due process cannot raise claims based
on substantive constitutional rights such as equal protection or freedom of
speech. 152 As a simple illustration, imagine a child has been expelled from
school, and the child’s parents think the expulsion is unjust. If the child is
entitled only to procedural due process, the parents could challenge the
expulsion only on the basis that the school did not follow the proper

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 100–01.
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22 (1982).
Id.
Motomura, supra note 120, at 1656.
Id.
Id.
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protocol when determining if expulsion was appropriate. 153 If the parents
wanted to challenge the expulsion because they thought the school
expelled the child due to the child’s race or religion, the claim would be
barred. Claims, such as the latter, concern substantive rights guaranteed in
the Constitution and are outside of the scope of procedural due process. 154
Although procedural due process entails something less than the
typical full complement of rights under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has noted that procedural due process nonetheless imposes
constraints on government decisionmakers. 155 One of these constraints is
the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. 156 Further, the
Supreme Court in Reno v. Flores reasoned that “[i]t is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings.” 157 Together, these principles require the federal government
to provide a meaningful hearing to those seeking asylum and withholding
of removal. 158 However, the immigration court system has systemically
deprived asylum and withholding of removal applicants of a meaningful
hearing and, thus, their procedural due-process rights. 159 Specifically, the
procedure for sustaining the burden of proof in asylum and withholding of
removal proceedings has allowed for arbitrariness and has effectively
deprived many non-citizens of their § 240(b)(2) hearing under the INA. 160
D. Pre-REAL ID Act Burden of Proof in Asylum and Withholding of
Removal
Just as there are different methods for non-citizens to seek asylum,
there are also different standards of proof. Pursuant to INA § 208(b)(1)(B),
an applicant has the burden of proving that he or she meets
§ 101(a)(42)(A)’s definition of a refugee. 161 An applicant is considered a
refugee if he or she establishes that race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion “will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.” 162 Immigration and Nationality Act
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
156. Id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
157. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
158. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333; Reno, 507 U.S. at 306.
159. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
160. Id.
161. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
162. Id.
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§ 101(a)(42)(A) defines a refugee as one who cannot return to his or her
country of origin because of persecution or a “well-founded fear of
persecution . . . .” 163 With regard to the burden of proof for establishing a
claim of asylum, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 governs. 164 This provision provides
that an applicant has a well-founded fear when: (1) the applicant has a fear
of persecution in the applicant’s home country on account of race,
nationality, religion, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion; (2) there is a reasonable possibility of persecution if the applicant
were to return to his or her home country; and (3) the applicant is unwilling
to return to the applicant’s home country because of such fear. 165 Notably,
the only objective criterion in this definition—and, thus, the only term in
need of defining—is reasonable possibility. The Supreme Court in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca held that a reasonable possibility may be a less than
50% chance of persecution. 166 Specifically, the Court noted, with no
apparent limiting language, that a possibility of future persecution as low
as 10% is a reasonable possibility. 167
Although asylum and withholding of removal are related claims of
relief, the applicant’s burden of proof for withholding of removal claims
is significantly higher. 168 As with asylum, the applicant generally carries
the burden of proof in withholding of removal. 169 However, to meet the
burden of proof, the applicant for withholding of removal must establish
that he or she would be threatened in the proposed country of removal due
to the applicant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. 170 The Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic
held that the would be standard requires an applicant for withholding of
removal to show that he or she would more likely than not be threatened
in the proposed country of removal on the basis of the protected
grounds. 171 However, in cases where the applicant has established past
persecution on the basis of the protected grounds, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the applicant would be subjected to future persecution on
account of those same characteristics. 172 The USCIS, however, may

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2022).
Id. § 1208.13(b)(2).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
See id. at 440.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2022).
Id. § 1208.16(b).
Id.
INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429–30 (1984).
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (2022).
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overcome the presumption. 173 The USCIS may do this by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conditions in the applicant’s home
country no longer pose a threat or that the applicant could relocate to a safe
place within the applicant’s home country. 174
The procedure for sustaining the burden of proof once the applicant is
in immigration court is the same for both asylum and withholding of
removal proceedings. 175 Congress enacted INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), the
provision governing these procedures, relatively recently in 1996 as part
of the REAL ID Act. 176 To understand Congress’s goals when enacting
this provision and the subsequent federal circuit split concerning its
meaning, a contextual overview is necessary.
Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act—in which Congress
enacted several amendments to the asylum statue governing matters
including corroboration, burden of proof, and credibility determinations—
the INA did not expressly allocate the burden of proving eligibility for
asylum. 177 However, in the accompanying regulations, the Department of
Homeland Security provided that the burden of proof falls on the asylum
seeker to prove that he or she is a refugee as defined by the INA. 178 The
regulations also provided that the testimony of the applicant may be
enough on its own to meet the burden of proof. 179
Courts have long recognized that asylum cases pose an inherent
problem when it comes to proof because the circumstances giving rise to
these claims often happen in distant countries rendering an investigation
impractical. 180 Recognizing this issue, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) has held that in some instances the applicant’s testimony may be the
only evidence available, and that testimony may suffice to meet the
applicant’s burden when “the testimony is believable, consistent, and
sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the
basis for . . . fear.” 181 The BIA has also noted that a lack of corroborating
173. See id.
174. See id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(ii).
175. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); INA §
241(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(C).
176. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); REAL ID Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
177. Glen, supra note 76, at 8.
178. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2022).
179. Id.
180. See Mejia-Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1997); Zhang v. INS,
386 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2004).
181. In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (B.I.A. 1987).
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evidence is not necessarily fatal to an applicant’s claim. 182 The BIA made
it clear, however, that every effort should be made to obtain such evidence
because insufficient corroborative evidence could be fatal when the
testimony alone does not persuade the immigration judge. 183
In the case of In re S-M-J-, the BIA elaborated on its position
regarding corroborative evidence, holding that corroborative evidence
should be provided when such evidence is reasonably expected. 184 Further,
the BIA noted that evidence such as the general conditions of the country
from which the asylum applicant is seeking refuge should normally be
available. 185 Additionally, the BIA clarified that even when the applicant’s
testimony is consistent with the general country conditions, corroborative
evidence, when reasonably available, still may be required in the form of
items such as birth certificates or media accounts of large
demonstrations. 186 Thus, the BIA made clear that, although not required,
corroborative evidence is generally necessary to carry the burden of
proof. 187
Federal circuit courts, however, did not unanimously adopt the BIA’s
framework for corroborative evidence before the REAL ID Act. 188 The
Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals provided the most thorough
support for the BIA’s framework, reasoning that the BIA’s framework was
consistent with the text of the INA because it acknowledged the use of the
permissive term may in the statute and directed that credible testimony
may not always be sufficient to carry the burden of proof. 189 Further, the
Second and Third Circuits noted that the BIA’s framework was consistent
with international standards for the treatment of refugees 190 and was also,
at a minimum, not inconsistent with precedent in their respective
jurisprudence. 191
The Ninth and Seventh Circuits, however, were not convinced that
corroborating evidence could be required when an applicant was deemed
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724–25 (B.I.A. 1997).
185. Id. at 724.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 724–25.
188. Glen, supra note 76, at 11.
189. Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 285–86 (2d Cir. 2000); Abdulai v. Ashcroft,
239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001).
190. THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, Handbook on Procs. and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on Int’l Prot., U.N. Doc.
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.4 (2019).
191. Diallo, 232 F.3d at 285–86; Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554.
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credible. 192 Specifically, in Uwase v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit held
that when an asylum applicant presents convincing testimony, the
applicant is not required to submit corroborating evidence even if the
evidence is easily attainable. 193 In Sidhu v. INS and Kataria v. INS, the
Ninth Circuit took a slightly different approach. 194 In these cases, the court
drew a line between using a failure to corroborate to make a general
credibility determination, which it deemed acceptable, and using a failure
to corroborate to deny an otherwise credible applicant relief, which it
deemed unacceptable. 195
II. REAL ID ACT
In 2005, Congress sought to remedy the above disagreement, among
other things, with the passage of the REAL ID Act (the Act).196 The
Conference Report for the Act observed that the INA did not provide
explicit evidentiary standards for the granting of asylum or the necessity
of corroborating evidence. 197 Further, the report observed that a circuit
split emerged over the standards for determining whether corroborating
evidence is necessary. 198 In its effort to remedy this discrepancy, Congress
enacted the following provision:
The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the
applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the applicant
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is credible,
is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate
that the applicant is a refugee. In determining whether the
applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may
weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record.
Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should
provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony,
such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have
the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence. 199
192. Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2000); Gontcharova v.
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 873, 877 (7th Cir. 2004).
193. Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 2003).
194. Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1090; Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.
2000).
195. Sidhu, 220 F.3d at 1090; Kataria, 232 F.3d at 1114.
196. Glen, supra note 76, at 16.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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With this provision, Congress adopted the BIA’s framework from In re SM-J- and codified the rule that corroborative evidence may be required to
carry the burden of proof even when the applicant has testified credibly. 200
This new provision, however, simply created a new disagreement
amongst the federal circuit courts. 201 Specifically, courts disagreed as to
the procedures required when an immigration judge determines that the
applicant must present corroborating evidence to meet his or her burden
of proof. 202 Some courts, such as the Ninth and Third Circuits, determined
that the statute is forward-looking, meaning that the immigration judge
must notify the applicant of deficiencies and allow the applicant to obtain
missing evidence or explain why such evidence is unobtainable. 203 Other
courts, such as the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,
favor a backward-looking approach, meaning that immigration judges
may deny relief altogether upon determining that corroborating evidence
was needed, reasonably available, and not provided. 204
A. The Forward-Looking Approach
The Ninth Circuit in Ren v. Holder concluded that a plain reading of
the relevant language of INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) indicates that the
provision is forward-looking. 205 In particular, the court looked to the
words where, determines, should provide, must be provided, does not
have, and cannot reasonably obtain. 206 The Ninth Circuit found this
language to be fundamentally forward-looking and that the prescribed
actions for the immigration judge are initiated at the moment he or she
decides that any or more corroboration is needed. 207 As an example, the
court reasoned that if Congress intended the provision to allow an
200. See generally In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1997).
201. See generally Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011); Saravia v.
Att’y Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 2018); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23
(2d Cir. 2018); Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch,
788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008);
Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2020).
202. See generally Ren, 648 F.3d 1079; Saravia, 905 F.3d 729; Wei Sun, 883
F.3d 23; Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d 757; Gaye, 788 F.3d 519; Rapheal, 533 F.3d 521;
Uzodinma, 951 F.3d 960.
203. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1079; Saravia, 905 F.3d at 737.
204. Wei Sun, 883 F.3d 23; Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d 757; Gaye, 788 F.3d 519;
Rapheal, 533 F.3d 521; Uzodinma, 951 F.3d 960.
205. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1091; see INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
206. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1091.
207. Id.
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immigration judge to deny relief after determining that corroborative
evidence is needed without giving the applicant an opportunity to remedy
the deficiency, then the statute would have used the phrase: “should have
provided.” 208 The Ninth Circuit next stated that the canons of
constitutional avoidance required that the provision be forward-looking,
holding that the REAL ID Act did not change the Ninth Circuit’s case law,
which requires a full and fair hearing in deportation proceedings. 209 The
court reasoned that demanding corroborative evidence to be produced
immediately on the day of the hearing or provided before notice is given
would raise serious due process concerns. 210 Thus, one should avoid such
an interpretation. 211
Although reaching the same conclusion, the Third Circuit in Saravia
v. Attorney General of the United States relied upon different reasoning. 212
Instead of breaking the statute down grammatically as the Ninth Circuit
did in Ren, the Third Circuit reasoned that the backward-looking approach
would render subsequent review meaningless. 213 The court decided that
the record for review would not be adequately developed if applicants
were not given an opportunity to obtain the corroborative evidence that is
found to be missing at the merits hearing or an opportunity to meaningfully
attempt to obtain this evidence. 214 The court also noted that it would be
temporally illogical to require an applicant to explain why certain evidence
could not be produced, noting the difference between asking why certain
evidence was not produced and asking why certain evidence could not be
produced. 215 The reasoning behind the distinction is that an applicant
cannot explain why evidence cannot reasonably be produced if the
applicant never tried to produce it.216 Finally, the Third Circuit stated that
to hold otherwise would allow for “gotcha” decisions in immigration
court. 217

208. Id.
209. Id. at 1092.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1093.
212. Saravia v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729, 737 (3d Cir. 2018).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 738.
216. Id.
217 . Id. (“That opportunity to supply evidence or explain why it is not
available can only occur before the Immigration Judge rules on the applicant’s
petition. To decide otherwise is illogical temporally and would allow for
‘gotcha’ conclusions in Immigration Judge opinions.”).
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B. The Backward-Looking Approach
Notably, after the above decision from the Ninth Circuit in Saravia
but before the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, the BIA
adopted the backward-looking approach. 218 In Matter of L-A-C-, the BIA
rendered a precedential decision219 in which it held that an immigration
judge who finds the evidence presented in the merits hearing in need of
corroboration is not required to provide an opportunity for the applicant to
remedy the deficiency. 220 The BIA reasoned that it is unreasonable to
require a judge to decide whether to grant a continuance at the merits
hearing, as required by the Ninth Circuit. 221 Further, the BIA stated that it
is often not clear until after the immigration judge has had time to review
the evidence the applicant provided whether any or more corroboration is
required to meet the burden of proof. 222 Thus, as opposed to the Ninth
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit had to address a precedential BIA decision in its
analysis of the procedure required by INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii). 223
The Fifth Circuit in Avelar-Oliva v. Barr began its analysis by citing
to Matter of L-A-C- and noting that it must give an agency’s interpretation
of the statutes it administers Chevron deference. 224 In Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the United States Supreme Court held that if
a statute is silent or ambiguous regarding an issue delegated to the agency,
courts must ask if the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. 225 Notably, the Ninth Circuit held that the
218. In re L-A-C-, 26 I & N Dec. 516, 516 (B.I.A. 2015); see generally
Saravia, 905 F.3d 729; Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020).
219. AAO Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.uscis.gov/administrative-appeals/aaodecisions [https://perma.cc/S283-46J3] (follow “Precedent Decisions” tab)
(“Precedent decisions are legally binding on the [Department of Homeland
Security] components responsible for enforcing immigration laws in all
proceedings involving the same issues. In addition, absent any controlling judicial
precedent to the contrary, federal courts give greater deference to [Administrative
Appeals Office] precedent decisions, as well as to non-precedent and adopted
decisions that follow the same legal reasoning of a precedent decision.”).
220. In re L-A-C-, 26 I & N Dec. at 516.
221. Id. at 523.
222. Id. at 516.
223. Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d at 770; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Couns., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
224. Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d at 770.
225. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
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statute was unambiguous. 226 Conversely, The Fifth Circuit held that while
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is plausible, it is not the only reasonable
interpretation and that the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable and, thus, is
afforded deference under Chevron. 227
As the Fifth Circuit noted in Avelar-Oliva, the majority of the circuits
that have decided the issue have adopted the backward-looking
approach. 228 In its 2008 decision of Raphael v. Mukasey, the Seventh
Circuit held that providing non-citizens with notice of deficiencies in their
corroborating evidence would be both unnecessary under INA
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) and imprudent because it would provide an additional
burden on the already overburdened DHS. 229 In 2015, the Sixth Circuit in
Gaye v. Lynch held that the language of § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) does not
unambiguously require notice of evidentiary deficiencies, thereby aligning
itself with the Seventh Circuit.230 In 2018, the Second Circuit in Wei Sun
v. Sessions held that § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) was ambiguous and upheld the BIA
interpretation in Matter of L-A-C- under Chevron. 231 Finally, the Eighth
Circuit in its 2020 decision Uzodinma v. Barr held that the notice provided
to non-citizens that corroborative evidence may be required to sustain the
burden of proof on the asylum application form and in the related statutes
is sufficient to satisfy any due process concerns. 232 Thus, courts on both
sides of the forward- versus backward-looking issue have pointed out
practical and logical issues with both approaches.
III. PITFALLS IN THE PRESENT PROCEDURE
The holdings of the federal circuit courts, INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), and
the relevant INA procedural statutes, such as INA § 240(b), have not
provided the immigration court system with a procedure that results in
consistent and predictable outcomes in asylum proceedings. 233 Further,

226. Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ren court’s
holding that the language of INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) is unambiguous suggests that
the Ninth Circuit would not adopt the backward-looking approach in a future case
despite the precedential BIA decision adopting the backward-looking approach.
227. Avelar-Oliva, 954 F.3d at 771.
228. Id. at 770.
229. Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008).
230. Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519, 530 (6th Cir. 2015).
231. Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018).
232. Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).
233. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
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both the forward- and backward-looking approaches present significant
issues.
First, in both approaches, the frequency with which immigration
judges within a single state grant relief to asylum applicants can vary as
much as 92%. 234 For example, between 2015 and 2020, one immigration
judge in the New York immigration courts granted asylum at a rate of 3%
while another granted asylum at a rate of 95%. 235 Such a variance is not
limited to New York. 236 In Oakdale, Louisiana, the variance in grant rate
ranged from a .5% to 21% over the same five-year span. 237 While modest
in magnitude compared to New York, the variance in Oakdale still
suggests that one asylum seeker in Oakdale may be over forty times more
likely to be granted asylum as another based on the immigration judge
presiding over his or her case. Further, these variances are not limited to
jurisdictions that have adopted the backward-looking approach. 238 In the
San Francisco immigration court, a jurisdiction subject to the Ninth
Circuit’s Ren holding, there is a variance of approximately 89%. 239 Two
facts underscore the significance of these variances. First, immigration
judges are assigned cases randomly. 240 Second, each of the New York and
Louisiana judges referenced above have decided over one hundred
cases. 241
The second issue is that about 20% of asylum applicants are
represented pro se, and these applicants are about half as likely to succeed
in their asylum cases as applicants who are represented by counsel. 242
While not explicitly shown in statistics, the disparity between pro se
applicants and those with counsel is likely attributable to pro se applicants’
unfamiliarity with the United States court system and inexperience with
the English language. These two factors make it even less likely that an
234. Asylum Denial Rates Continue to Climb, TRAC IMMIGR. (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/630/ [https://perma.cc/W7YH-B5W5].
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
239. Id.
240. Marissa Esthimer, Crisis in the Courts: Is the Backlogged U.S.
Immigration Court System at its Breaking Point?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Oct.
3, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/backlogged-us-immigrationcourts-breaking-point [https://perma.cc/MWV2-ZLRC].
241. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
242. Record Number of Asylum Cases in FY 2019, TRAC IMMIGR. (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/588/ [https://perma.cc/MS8C-34WD].
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applicant will be able to identify and produce the evidence needed to
corroborate their case with nothing more to aid them than Form I-589 and
INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii). Notably, this number does not include those
immigrants who did not apply for asylum because they could not navigate
the process on their own. 243 The large variances in grant rates within
individual immigration courts illuminate the widespread issue with
fairness within the United States’s immigration court system that gives rise
to serious due process concerns.
In addition to the inconsistency issue, the backward-looking approach
also raises a serious concern about the adequacy of notice prior to the
merits hearing. The Eighth Circuit in Uzodinma stated that the asylum
application, Form I-589, and the related statutes provide sufficient notice
to applicants about what evidence is needed and the consequences of not
producing it. 244 However, this position does not withstand scrutiny.
Regarding the evidence applicants should provide, Form I-589
instructions provide that “[s]upporting evidence may include but is not
limited to newspaper articles, affidavits of witnesses or experts, medical
and/or psychological records, doctors’ statements, periodicals, journals,
books, photographs, official documents, or personal statements or live
testimony from witnesses or experts.” 245 Next, the Seventh Circuit in
Rapheal reasoned that the relevant statutes provide immigrants with
sufficient notice and cited to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). 246 This
provision states “[w]here the trier of fact determines that the applicant
should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony,
such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have the
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 247 This provision is
also what the Eighth Circuit in Uzodinma referred to with the term relevant
statutes. 248 These sources do not provide immigrants with case-specific
recommendations for what evidence may be needed to support their
particular claim and, thus, do not always provide particularly helpful
guidance to applicants.
In fact, Ren itself provides a clear example of a case where Form I589 and the relevant statutes were not particularly helpful in identifying
the corroborative evidence needed to support the particular claim at
issue. 249 In that case, the immigration judge indicated that a bail receipt
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2020).
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 5.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) is the codified version of INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2008).
Uzodinma, 951 F.3d at 966.
Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011).
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from the Chinese government, a baptismal certificate, and live testimony
from the applicant’s pastor in the United States was needed to corroborate
the applicant’s claim. 250 It would likely be disingenuous to say that live
testimony from a pastor is a foreseeable request from the notice given in
Form I-589 and § INA 208(b)(1)(B)(ii). 251 The applicant in Ren obtained
counsel and still did not produce the corroborative evidence needed, which
further underscores the assertion that these requests are not foreseeable to
the typical pro se applicant. 252 Moreover, when the immigration judge
informed the applicant in Ren that testimony from the pastor was required,
the applicant’s counsel asked whether an affidavit would suffice. 253 This
shows that even the counsel was unsure about what form in which the
evidence must be even after being told what the substance of the evidence
should be. 254
The immigration judge in Ren, after determining that more evidence
was needed, provided the applicant with a continuance to obtain the
evidence requested. 255 Under the backward-looking approach, however,
the immigration judge could simply have denied the applicant’s asylum or
withholding of removal claim because he or she thought live testimony
from a pastor was necessary but not provided. 256 Such a decision would
be, in the words of the Third Circuit, a “gotcha” decision, 257 and it would
be difficult to argue that such a decision was the result of the meaningful
and fair hearing as required by the Fifth Amendment 258 and INA §
250. Id.
251. See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supra note 5; INA
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
252. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1093.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018); Avelar-Oliva v.
Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2015);
Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. Barr, 951 F.3d
960 (8th Cir. 2020).
257. Saravia v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729, 737–38 (3d Cir. 2018).
258. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation
proceedings.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903):
Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any
executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute,
arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has become
subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population,
although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and
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240(b). 259 Thus, the backward-looking approach fails to provide applicants
with a meaningful amount of notice as to what evidence will be needed to
carry the burden of proof prior to a final adjudication. A system that grants
judges the ability to deny relief prior to meaningful notice being given to
the applicant does not adequately limit the judge’s discretion and, thus,
enables immigration judges to rule based on personal beliefs and
predispositions. Thus, this lack of notice, in addition to the large variances
in grant rates under both approaches, calls into question the adequacy of
the due process afforded to applicants in the immigration court system.
IV. A PROCEDURAL REMEDY
To remedy the above issues with efficiency and efficacy, Congress
should pass an amendment to the INA requiring a pre-merits hearing
conference between the asylum applicant and the immigration judge. In
the conference, the immigration judge would provide non-binding advice
regarding which aspects of the applicant’s testimony need corroboration.
While not binding, the production of the needed corroborating evidence
identified by the immigration judge would provide a presumption that the
applicant has met the burden of proof. Therefore, this solution requires the
immigration judge to provide reasons why the immigrant has not met the
burden of proof despite the production of the evidence identified in the
conference. 260 By providing an informal hearing as opposed to a
continuance, this solution balances the interest of the asylum seekers in
receiving a fair hearing and the government’s interest in efficiency.
The United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge provided a
framework for determining the appropriate balance between the due
process rights for certain parties and the government’s interest in efficient
proceedings. 261 Although Congress is not bound by this case, the reasoning
deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the
questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No
such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due
process of law are recognized.
259. INA § 240(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b).
260. FED. R. EVID. 301, Advisory Committee’s Note to 1972 Proposed Rule
(“Presumptions governed by this rule are given the effect of placing upon the
opposing party the burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact,
once the party invoking the presumption establishes the basic facts giving rise to
it.”).
261. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961)) (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”).
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set forth in Mathews nonetheless provides a structured way to craft a
solution to the aforementioned issues. 262 Specifically, the Court stated that
“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
situation demands.” 263 The Court provided three factors to consider when
determining the extent of due process required in a certain situation. 264
These factors include: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests
through the procedures used, and the probable value . . . of additional . . .
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
. . . fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional . . . procedural
requirement would entail.” 265
First, the private interests involved in asylum and withholding of
removal cases are significant, as these decisions can carry life or death
consequences. 266 Quintero precisely illustrates the important nature of
private interests involved.267 In this case, the applicant faced deportation
back to El Salvador where an international street gang waited to punish
him for leaving the gang. 268 The courts that have adopted the backwardlooking approach have not meaningfully grappled with the high personal
interests of asylum applicants. 269 In advocating for the backward-looking
approach, the Seventh Circuit in Rapheal summarily held that the
additional burden of a second hearing was not justified by the interests
present in asylum cases especially where the law provides notice. 270
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Uzodinma summarily considered the
interests at stake when it held that the notice provided in the relevant
statues and the asylum application form provided sufficient notice to
satisfy any due process concerns. 271
Second, regarding the risk of erroneous deportations under the current
approaches, the wide variances in grant rates indicate that the risk of

262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 335.
265. Id.
266. See Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612 (4th Cir. 2021).
267. See id.
268. Id. at 619.
269. See generally Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 2018); AvelarOliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2020); Gaye v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 519 (6th
Cir. 2015); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2008); Uzodinma v. Barr,
951 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2020).
270. See Rapheal, 533 F.3d at 530.
271. Uzodinma, 951 F.3d at 966.
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erroneous deportations is also significant. 272 Thus, it is clear that the first
and second Mathews factors weigh in favor of a more robust procedure for
asylum and withholding of removal claims. Therefore, the remaining
question under Mathews pertains to the third factor—specifically whether
there is a solution that meaningfully reduces the risk of erroneous
deportation and does not inappropriately burden the immigration court
system with additional procedural costs. To meaningfully reduce the risk
of erroneous deportation while balancing procedural costs, the solution
will need to address the inconsistency, notice, and backlog issues under
the backward- and forward-looking approaches.
A. Consistency and Notice
The large variance in grant rates in the San Francisco immigration
court suggests that a simple adoption of the forward-looking approach
would not remedy the consistency issue. 273 This inefficacy, even under the
forward-looking approach, is likely attributable to the fact that the
credibility of applicants can be tainted if they present little-to-no evidence
corroborating their claim at the merits hearing, especially in the eyes of an
immigration judge that favors denial. In fact, it is completely natural to
distrust any account that lacks support. Thus, given the fact that the type
and amount of evidence needed to support a claim is completely
discretionary, the credibility of the witness can have a large impact on how
onerous the immigration judge makes the evidentiary requirements. 274
Thus, providing notice to applicants about what evidence will likely be
required to support their case prior to the merits hearing would aid the
applicant in appearing credible, thereby addressing both the notice issue
and the consistency issue.
The proposed meeting would provide the notice needed to increase the
credibility of applicants by giving the immigration judge an opportunity
to review the applicant’s testimony and any corroborative evidence the
applicant provides. The judge would then direct the applicant to portions
of his or her testimony that need corroboration. Such an opportunity would
provide several advantages beyond creating a presumption that makes an
erroneous denial less likely. First, it would reduce the likelihood that an
immigration judge will find an applicant’s testimony not credible.
Specifically, it would accomplish this by identifying evidence that
applicants could use to support their testimony and giving applicants the
272. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.
273. Id.
274. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).
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opportunity to gather such evidence prior to the merits hearing, thereby
helping applicants to present a convincing case at the merits hearing.
Second, the presumption would, at least to a certain extent, give the
immigration judge an additional incentive to rule in a manner that is
consistent with the evidence and the law. This is because the presumption
would act as an assurance granted to applicants by the immigration judge
that if they produce the identified evidence then they have a strong chance
of success. This presumption would create a disincentive for judges to
repeatedly deny applications after giving such assurances, as doing so
would make the judge seem, at best, unreliable. Lastly, as the BIA
indicated in Matter of L-A-C-, immigration judges often need time to
examine an applicant’s testimony to determine which aspects need
corroboration. 275 This solution keeps that reality in mind by creating a
presumption that the burden of proof has been met, thus leaving room for
further consideration.
B. Backlog
Considering the government’s interest in procedural efficiency,
requiring all courts to adopt the holdings of the forward-looking approach
would likely not be a workable solution under Mathews. 276 This is because
granting a continuance imposes a significant procedural burden, as it not
only prolongs proceedings by several months but also requires an
additional merits hearing. 277 However, simply adopting the backwardlooking approach in the name of efficiency is likely not a workable
solution under Mathews either. The Seventh Circuit noted in Rapheal that
providing applicants with notice of the specific corroborative evidence
needed to support their case increases the burden on the already-burdened
system. 278 Any increase in the burden on the system, however, does not
necessarily outweigh upholding the due-process rights given to applicants.
As the Mathews court explained, the interests of the parties must be
weighed. 279 Thus, a solution, such as adopting the backward-looking
approach, that reduces the backlog but does not consider the cost of
sacrificing due process afforded to applicants is not workable. 280
The proposed solution of a pre-merits hearing conference would be
more workable than the present approaches, as it would not require the
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

In re L-A-C-, 26 I & N Dec. 516, 516 (B.I.A. 2015).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 2011).
Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 521 (7th Cir. 2008).
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 335.
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unplanned continuance, which results when a deficiency is identified in
the Ninth and Third Circuits. 281 Such unplanned continuances can delay
proceedings several months and further contributes to the backlog of
cases. 282 Further, the combination of the increased credibility and the
presumption would lead to less appeals, which would help to offset the
long-term cost of adding the additional conference. The reduced frequency
of appeals and the low cost of the conference relative to a continuance
would likely result in the new conference costs being offset by the
improved efficacy. Thus, the proposed hearing offers a solution that both
acknowledges the present due process concerns while minimizing the
burden on the government.
C. The Proposed Text of the INA Amendment
Congress should implement the proposed change in legislation by
amending INA § 240(b)(2). 283 Presently, INA § 240(b)(2) provides the
form of removal proceedings and states that removal proceedings may take
place in person, by video conference, or over the telephone. 284 To
implement the above conference, Congress should add a Part C to
§ 240(b)(2) that states:
(C) Asylum and Withholding of Removal
In addition to the requirements provided for in paragraphs (A)
and (B), in proceedings concerning asylum and withholding
of removal, there shall be a conference between the noncitizen seeking relief under §§ 208, 235(b), or 241(b)(3) of
this Act and the immigration judge in which the immigration
judge shall identify any evidence that in his or her judgment
must be supported with evidence beyond the testimony of the
applicant in order to sustain the burden of proof. Any
applicant that produces the identified evidence shall be
presumed to have met the burden of proof.
The first sentence of the above provision would establish the proposed
meeting between the calendar and merits hearings for proceedings brought
under INA §§ 208, 235(b), and 241(b)(3). Again, this meeting would serve
281. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1093; Saravia v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 905 F.3d 729, 737
(3d Cir. 2018).
282. Ren, 648 F.3d at 1093.
283. See INA § 240(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(2).
284. Id.
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to remedy the notice issues raised under the present backward-looking
approach while also imposing a lesser burden on the immigration court
system than the forward-looking approach. The second sentence of the
above provision establishes the presumption that the burden of proof has
been met if the applicant produces the evidence identified by the
immigration judge in the meeting established in the first sentence. This
presumption would serve to reduce the wide variances in grant rates by
giving the immigration judge a greater incentive to carefully consider the
evidence by the time it reaches the merit hearing.
Lastly, although this provision in practice allows the judge to aid the
applicant, it does not fundamentally change the role of the judge to an
advocate. Rather, it provides the judge an opportunity to better execute his
or her duty to develop the record for appeal. The duty to develop the
record, as the Quintero court noted, is an important role for immigration
judges. 285 INA § 240(b)(1) provides the duties of immigration judges in
removal proceedings. 286 Among these duties are the duties to receive
evidence and examine non-citizens. 287 Further, the Ninth Circuit in Jacinto
v. INS and Hussain v. Rosen provided boundaries for the role of an
immigration judge within removal proceedings. 288 First, the court in
Jacinto explained that immigration judges must make it clear to applicants
that they have an opportunity to present testimony in support of their
case. 289 Second, the court in Hussain held that while the immigration judge
must give the applicant an opportunity to be heard, the immigration judge
cannot guide the applicant’s testimony towards meeting the requirements
for establishing refugee status. 290 The proposed solution fits within the
framework the Ninth Circuit provides because it does not call for the
immigration judge to guide the applicant towards the requisite status.

285. Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612, 619 (4th Cir. 2021).
286. INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1):
The immigration judge shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.
The immigration judge may issue subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and presentation of evidence. The immigration judge shall
have authority (under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General) to
sanction by civil money penalty any action (or inaction) in contempt of
the judge’s proper exercise of authority under this chapter.
287. Id.
288. See Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2000); Hussain v. Rosen, 985
F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2021).
289. Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 728.
290. Hussain, 985 F.3d at 644.
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Rather, it merely calls on the immigration judge to inform applicants about
what evidence they need to establish the testimony as credible.
CONCLUSION
Section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the INA and its forward-and-backwardlooking interpretations as adopted by the United States Circuit Courts have
failed to efficiently and effectively provide non-citizens seeking relief
from persecution with a full, fair, and meaningful hearing. This is evident
in the aforementioned variances, which indicate that a non-citizen’s hope
for relief does not necessarily depend upon the merits of his or her case
but instead on which immigration judge is assigned to the case. 291 This
apparent shortfall in the immigration court system is a strong indication
that a change in legislation is necessary to provide a procedure that
benefits a vulnerable class of people. To resolve this shortfall, Congress
should amend the INA to provide immigrants who produce the evidence
an immigration judge requests at a pre-merits hearing conference with a
presumption that they have met their burden of proof. Additional rights for
asylum-seekers and withholding of removal applicants will help prevent
people, like Mr. Quintero, from arbitrarily being denied safety due to their
inability to effectively advocate for themselves.

291. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts FY 2015–2020,
supra note 25.

